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Plantage Muidergracht 4, 1018 TV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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VAN GORCUM - ASSEN - THE NETHERLANDS
THE WORKING CLASS AND THE WELFARE STATE
SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION, TOLERANCE FOR
NONCONFORMITY, AND THE CONDITIONALITY OF SOLIDARITY
WITH THE UNEMPLOYED

DICK HOUTMAN

Introduction

The founding of the welfare state is generally considered a working-class triumph, as it entails a de-commodification of labour (Esping-Andersen 1990) and a weakening of the links between work and income and between income and opportunities for consumption (Van Stiphout 1988). As a consequence, the working class is held to have a special interest in its maintenance and expansion. Nevertheless, studies on solidarity, conceived of as support for the relatively unconditional provision of social rights, typically fail to observe the expected solidarity among the working class, as Van Oorschot points out (1998, 72). This finding is even more striking since the working class is known to support economic redistribution more strongly than any other class. How then can we explain the paradox that the working class supports economic redistribution more strongly than other classes, but not the relatively unconditional granting of social rights? This article addresses this issue.

I explain that the welfare state simultaneously constitutes a regime of economic redistribution and a disciplining instrument. Drawing on insights from political sociology, this idea is elaborated into a number of hypotheses, which present a plausible explanation for the paradox. The hypotheses are tested with data collected from the Dutch population in the summer of 1997, focusing on solidarity with the unemployed - more specifically on support for the relatively unconditional granting of the right to social benefits to unemployed citizens.
I summarize my main findings and briefly elaborate on their theoretical implications for research on solidarity.

Hypotheses

Social class, support for economic redistribution, and tolerance for nonconformity

The working class supports economic redistribution more strongly than any other social class (Marshall et al. 1988, 179-183, Middendorp 1991, De Witte 1990, Steijn and De Witte 1991, Kraaykamp et al. 1989). This finding is con-
capital as well (Kalmijn 1994). It is not difficult to understand why cultural capital might positively affect tolerance for nonconformity. After all, given a highly developed capacity to recognize cultural expressions and understand their meaning, it is unlikely for unconventional lifestyles and patterns of culture to be defined as morally reprehensible deviations from an absolute 'extra-cultural' or 'meta-social' moral foundation. Instead, these patterns are more likely to be recognized as culture - i.e. as humanly constructed and ultimately contingent and arbitrary - which leads to a general tendency to tolerate nonconformity (cf. Gabbensche 1972, Bauman 1987, 81-95).

Hypotheses
The foregoing suggests that education is quite a dangerous variable in political sociology, indicator as it is of social class as well as cultural capital. Explaining support for economic redistribution, it can be expected to have a negative effect, tapping social class; explaining tolerance for nonconformity, it can be expected to have a positive effect as an indicator of cultural capital. As income only taps social class, income effects are more readily interpretable. Along with education, income may be expected to negatively affect support for economic redistribution; unlike education, however, it is unlikely to affect tolerance for nonconformity.

Statistical effects of ambiguous variables such as social class or education, simultaneously tapping the strength of the economic position and cultural capital, are unlikely to provide much theoretical clarity as to the explanation of tolerance for nonconformity. From a theoretical point of view, it is thus necessary to systematically compare how more explicit indicators for social class and cultural capital affect support for economic redistribution and tolerance for nonconformity.

Following the logic of class analysis, two explicit class indicators can be added to income. Of course, wage dependence is traditionally conceived of as a key indicator for social class, as people who need to sell their labour occupy weaker economic positions than people who own the means of production (Marx 1867 [1867], Marx and Engels 1948 [1848], Weber 1922 [1922], Wright 1979, 1985, Giddens 1980). Job insecurity is another additional indicator. After all, people with insecure jobs occupy weak economic positions as well. So a low income, wage dependence, job insecurity, and a poor educational level may all be expected to lead to stronger support for economic redistribution.

As 'institutionalized' cultural capital, education is distinguished from 'embodied' cultural capital, i.e. an interest in art and culture (Bourdieu 1986, see also Lamont and Lareau 1988, Böröcz and Southworth 1996). As a consequence, cultural capital is not only indicated by education, but by cultural participation as well. Now, if education’s consequences for the acceptance of cultural diversity should indeed be interpreted in terms of cultural capital rather than social class, cultural participation should have a similar effect, while the three explicit indicators for social class should not affect it. Conversely, cultural participation should not affect support for economic redistribution, whereas education and the three explicit indicators for social class should.

If these hypotheses are confirmed, the working class is likely to be cross pressed into merely average solidarity with the unemployed, as it supports the redistributive as well as the disciplining functions of the welfare state more strongly than other classes. Its support for economic redistribution, stemming from its weak economic position, is likely to give rise to a high level of solidarity, while its low level of tolerance for nonconformity, stemming from its limited cultural capital, is likely to give rise to a low level of solidarity.

Data and Measurement

Data
Data were collected during the summer of 1997 by means of the panel of Centerdata (Catholic University Brabant, Tilburg, The Netherlands). This panel is a representative sample of the Dutch population. Panel members have a home computer to answer questions posed by Dutch researchers. The length of the questionnaire necessitated a division in two, with the two parts answered at different moments. The first part included questions for the economically active as well as the economically inactive (primarily questions about cultural participation, support for economic redistribution, tolerance for nonconformity, and conditionality of solidarity with the unemployed). A total of 1856 persons above the age of 18 answered this first part, yielding a response rate of 90%. The second part only included questions for the economically active panel members (questions to measure social class, job insecurity and so forth). Therefore, this second part was only answered by people who were economically active for at least 20 hours a week. This yielded 792 respondents, again a response rate of about 90% and 711 of them had answered the first part as well. Of course, the subsequent analysis is limited to these 711 respondents.

Measurement
Conditionality of solidarity with the unemployed was measured by three types of questions, all of which were previously validated (Houtman 1994; 1997). First, the acceptance or rejection of the right to social benefits and the obligation to work were ascertained.1 Answers to these two questions were combined into three categories: 1) acceptance of both principles (83.3%), 2) acceptance of the obligation to work and rejection of the right to social benefits (5.6%), and 3) rejection of the obligation to work and acceptance of the right to social benefits (10.7%). Then the respondents were asked to evaluate two proposals to
introduce an alternative system of social benefits, in which either the right to social benefits or the obligation to work was emphasized at the expense of the other: a guaranteed basic income (Van Parijs 1992) and a system of workfare (Mead 1986). Answers to these two questions were combined into four categories: (1) positive evaluation of workfare and negative evaluation of basic income (42.1%), (2) positive evaluation of workfare and undecided evaluation of basic income ('don't know') (8.7%), (3) either positive or negative evaluation of both workfare and basic income (39.5%), and (4) positive evaluation of basic income and either negative or undecided evaluation of workfare (9.7%). Third, the respondents were asked to evaluate four specific cases of refusal by an unemployed person to accept a job offer (see Figure 1 for an example). For each of these cases, the respondents were asked whether sanctioning by cutting the benefit for a period of three months was considered fair and if so, how high this sanction should be. Nine answering categories were used ranging from 0 (not deemed fair) to 8 (cutting the benefit by more than NLG 750 a month deemed fair).

Figure 1. Example of One of the Four Cases Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation/education</th>
<th>psychologist (university education)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment duration</td>
<td>2 years (has never been employed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household composition</td>
<td>single; no children (unemployment benefit NLG 1,315.00 a month)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job offered</td>
<td>parking lot attendant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net monthly income</td>
<td>NLG 1,700.00 a month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evaluations of the four cases of work refusal and the two other variables have been analysed by means of HOMALS (SPSS), which yields a well interpretable first dimension with an eigenvalue of 0.54. Discrimination measures are 0.29 for the combined evaluation of the two alternative systems of social benefits, 0.21 for the combined evaluation of the obligation to work and the right to social benefits, and higher than 0.50 for the judgments on the four cases of work refusal. The highest scores are assigned to the panel members who reject unemployed people's right to social benefits and accept their obligation to work, the ones who reject a guaranteed basic income and accept a system of workfare, and the ones who feel large cuts are justified in cases of job refusal. The measure's reliability is 0.81 (Cronbach's Alpha). Scores have been transformed into a scale ranging from 0 through 10 with the highest scores indicating the strongest tendency to make solidarity with the unemployed conditional on deservingness.

Tolerance for nonconformity is tapped by low scores on the F-scale for authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950). This classical measure is strongly and positively related to the moral rejection of a wide variety of out-groups and unconventional lifestyles, such as homosexuals, emancipated women, ethnic minorities and immigrants, the unemployed and AIDS patients (Midendorp 1991, Eisenga and Scheepers 1991, Dekker and Elster 1993). Support for economic redistribution has been measured by means of six Likert-type items (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Factor Analysis of Items Indicating Support for Economic Redistribution and Tolerance for Nonconformity (Varimax rotation; N=541)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should raise the level of social benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real poverty no longer exists in the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large income differences are unfair since everyone is equal in principle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowadays, the working class no longer needs to fight for an equal position in society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should take drastic measures to reduce income differences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies should be forced to give their employees a fair share of the profits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowadays more and more people interfere with matters that should remain personal and private.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity breeds contempt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our social problems would be largely solved if we could somehow remove criminals and antisocial elements from society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What we need is fewer laws and institutions and more courageous, tireless and dedicated leaders, whom the people can trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person with bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly be expected to get along with decent people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual crimes such as rape and child abuse deserve more than imprisonment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The offenders should be given corporal punishment in public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If people would talk less and work harder, everything would work out better.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale scores have been assigned to panel members with at most two missing values on each of the respective sets of items. Although the reliability of the scale for nonconformity tolerance is higher (Cronbach's α=0.79), the one for economic redistribution support is satisfactory as well (Cronbach's α=0.71).
Both scales range from 0 to 10 with high scores indicating high levels of support for economic redistribution and high levels of tolerance for nonconformity. Their relationship is exactly 0.00, confirming the independence of both of the constructs.

**Social class** is measured by means of the class scheme developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979, Goldthorpe 1980, 39-42), which is widely used in international comparative research (Nieuwebeerta 1992, 1996). The coding scheme, for the Netherlands, published by Bakker et al. (1997), assigns EGP class positions to the gainfully employed based on 1) their occupational title, 2) whether they are self-employed or not, and 3) the number of people being supervised.

Class I (15.0%) consists of highly qualified professionals, administrators and officials, managers of large organizations and substantial owners (including the liberal professions), and class II (30.2%) consists of less highly qualified professionals, administrators and officials, managers of smaller organizations, highly skilled technicians and supervisors of nonmanual workers. Class III (21.2%) consists of routine nonmanual workers, and class IV (5.3%) of small self-employed businessmen. Classes VI (5.8%) and VII (14.2%) constitute the ‘skilled’ and ‘semi- and unskilled’ working class. Class V (7.5%) consists of highly skilled technicians and supervisors of manual workers, distinguished from the working class proper. This class scheme is not fully hierarchical, as it is not possible to order all seven classes within a single hierarchy ranging from class I (highest) to class VII (lowest). However, classes I, II, and III do form a hierarchy, as do classes V, VI, and VII.

**Income** has been measured as both net personal income and net family income. I use the former to assess the strength of the relation between EGP class and income, and the latter to explain the support for economic redistribution. I herewith follow Erikson’s suggestion that with respect to the strength of the market position, the household is the most significant unit of analysis (1984). Mean net personal income is NLG 3,072.00 (s.d. = NLG 1,535.00) and of course the mean net family income is higher: NLG 4,468.00 (s.d. = NLG 1,119.00).

**Wage dependence,** also used to construct the seven EGP classes, was established by asking whether the panel members are self-employed (6.0%) or in paid employment (94.0%).

**Job insecurity** has been operationalized by means of three questions. First, the panel members were asked whether (5.3%) or not (94.7%) they work on a temporary contract. Second, the number of times they were unemployed since the completion of their education was ascertained. The answers have been recoded into three categories: never (86.8%), once (7.2%) and twice or more (6.0%). Third, the panel members were asked to estimate the likelihood of someone with a similar job and contract (either permanent or temporary) being forced to find another job within the next three years. A total of 20.4% said it was 'very unlikely', 31.4% 'quite unlikely', 36.6% 'neither likely nor unlikely' or did not know, 8.3% 'quite likely', and 3.4% 'very likely'. After standardization, the three indicators have been added up and transformed into a scale ranging from 0 (lowest job insecurity) to 10 (highest job insecurity).

Seven levels of education have been distinguished: 1) no education or only primary school (6.1%); 2) lower vocational school (LBV) (15.5%); 3) lower general secondary school (MULO/MAVO) (16.8%); 4) higher general secondary school (HAVO) or pre-university secondary school (HBS/VOG) (12.1%); 5) intermediate vocational school (MBO) (17.9%); 6) higher vocational college (HBO) (20.6%); 7) university (5.9%).

Finally, **cultural participation** has been measured by means of seven questions, on the 1) number of books owned, 2) number of novels read during the three months preceding the interview, 3) frequency of attending concerts, 4) frequency of attending theater, cabaret or ballet performances, 5) frequency of going to art exhibitions (e.g. at a museum), 6) frequency of discussing arts and culture with others and 7) degree to which one considers oneself an 'art lover'. These variables have been standardized, added up, and transformed into a scale ranging from 1 to 10 with high scores indicating strong cultural participation (Cronbach’s α = 0.79).

**Results**

**Working class solidarity with the unemployed, support for economic redistribution, and tolerance for nonconformity**

First, it is necessary to examine the relations between EGP-class and solidarity with the unemployed, support for economic redistribution and tolerance for nonconformity. Compared to other classes, solidarity with the unemployed is neither stronger nor weaker among the working class. The differences between the seven classes are not significant. So Van Oorschot’s claim that the working class does not ardently support relatively unconditionally granting social rights has been confirmed (1998, 72).

As to support for economic redistribution, a different picture emerges. Four of the seven classes score above the grand mean of 4.89. As this only marginally applies to classes III and especially V, it is evident that the two others, classes VI and VII (the working class), are the most supportive. They deviate most from the self-employed (class IV), who are least likely to support the idea that the state is responsible for reducing income differences resulting from free market competition. Although these findings confirm the idea that the working class is relatively supportive of economic redistribution, the differences between the classes are quite small. The explained variance is a mere 7%.

With 12% of the variance explained, the differences with regard to tolerance for nonconformity are more substantial. Only classes I and II are more tolerant...
Table 2. Conditionality of Solidarity with the Unemployed, Support for Economic Redistribution and Tolerance for Nonconformity by Social Class (analyses of variance: deviations from means).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class</th>
<th>Conditionality of solidarity with the unemployed</th>
<th>Support for economic redistribution</th>
<th>Tolerance for nonconformity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VI</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-1.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean 5.49 4.89 5.53
η 0.12 (n.s.) 0.25*** 0.35***
R² (%) 1.4 (n.s.) 6.5*** 12.4***
N 906 697 682

n.s.: p>0.05; *** p<0.001

than average. The lowest levels are found within the working class, i.e. classes VI and VII. So analysing the relation between social class and support for economic redistribution and tolerance for nonconformity, we observe exactly the pattern predicted by Lipset: the working class is characterized by a relatively high level of support for economic redistribution and a relatively low level of tolerance for nonconformity.

**Opening up the Black Box**

The idea that the observed relations stem from two different mechanisms - with social class explaining support for economic redistribution and cultural capital explaining tolerance for nonconformity - assumes that measures of social class such as the one used here entail economic position as well as cultural capital. Therefore, it is important to open the black box of EGP class. In doing so, I bypass the differences as to wage dependence between the seven classes, since they are used in the coding procedure of the EGP class scheme. For instance, all the members of class IV are self-employed, whereas workers in classes VI and VII cannot be. As to the remaining indicators for social class and cultural capital, Table 3 displays the contents of the black box, be it only to the extent that they are relevant to the current discussion of course.

As regards income, the seven classes differ substantially. Almost thirty per cent of the personal income differences can be explained on the basis of class membership. As income is usually considered the main standard for assessing the validity of class measures, this is not surprising. As the seven classes are likely to differ with respect to age, gender, and number of working hours, three variables known to have income consequences, Table 3 also shows the income differences after controlling for them. This hardly affects the size of the income differences between the seven classes (y only slightly decreases from 0.53 to 0.47). On the average, members of classes VI and VII, the working class, have lower incomes.

As to job insecurity, the seven classes hardly differ. Only five per cent of the differences are explained by the distinction between the seven classes, with classes III and VII characterized the most by job insecurity. This is striking, as the validity of a class measure that fails to express economic insecurity differences may be doubtful. Finally, the differences regarding education and to a somewhat lesser extent cultural participation are substantial: 34% of the educational differences and 14% of the cultural participation ones are expressed by the distinction between the seven classes. The working class is not only the most poorly educated, it is also least interested in the arts and culture.

Summing up, the working class is characterized by a relatively weak economic position and limited cultural capital. This confirms that EGP class not only expresses economic position, but cultural capital as well.

**Solidarity with the Unemployed Explained**

Is the working class cross-pressured into merely average levels of solidarity with the unemployed as a consequence of its support for economic redistribution stemming from its weak economic position and evoking a high level of...
solidarity and its low level of tolerance for nonconformity stemming from its limited cultural capital and evoking a low level of solidarity? To answer this question, a path model has been constructed by means of OLS regression. Figure 2 shows how support for economic redistribution and tolerance for nonconformity are affected by social class and cultural capital indicators and how they then affect solidarity with the unemployed.

Figure 2. Conditionality of Solidarity with the Unemployed Explained (N=644; only significant paths (p<0.05) shown; R² conditionality of solidarity: 14.4%; R² support for economic redistribution: 9.0%; R² tolerance for nonconformity: 22.2%).

A low family income and educational level, job insecurity and wage dependence—in short a weak economic position— all lead to stronger support for economic redistribution. Although none of these effects are very strong (they range from 0.10 to 0.20), the explained variance is slightly higher than in the previous analysis, where EGP class was used as the independent variable (9% as compared to 7%). Cultural participation, the only variable that does not indicate social class, has no effect on support for economic redistribution. So the working class not only supports economic redistribution, this is indeed caused by its weak class position. This relation results from the economic interests at stake; since the working class has more of an interest in economic redistribution, it is most strongly in favor of it.

Tolerance for nonconformity is strongly and positively affected by education. This is not surprising, since it has been demonstrated by many other studies. We have seen, however, that some researchers consider this a class effect, whereas others claim it is not. For two reasons, the findings confirm the latter. First, neither income nor job insecurity nor wage dependence affect tolerance for nonconformity. This is not what we would expect if, like support for economic redistribution, tolerance for nonconformity could be explained on the basis of social class. Second, a high level of cultural participation contributes to tolerance for nonconformity almost as strongly as a high level of education. So unlike working-class support for economic redistribution, its limited tolerance for nonconformity is not caused by its weak economic position, but by its limited cultural capital. What is more, in terms of explained variance, education and cultural participation provide a stronger explanation than the measure of social class that was previously used (22% as compared to 12%).

The implications of these findings as regards the idea that support for economic redistribution and tolerance for nonconformity can both be explained on the basis of social class are obvious. Indeed, if EGP classes are compared, the lowest tolerance for nonconformity is observed within the working class. This does not necessarily mean Lipset’s hypothesis has been confirmed. Unlike support for economic redistribution, tolerance for nonconformity cannot be explained on the basis of economic position. Instead, it is caused by limited cultural capital.

Finally, none of the social class or cultural capital indicators directly affect solidarity with the unemployed. Nevertheless, a low family income and educational level, job insecurity and wage dependence all indirectly lead to a higher level of solidarity with the unemployed. A weak economic position increases support for economic redistribution, which in turn strengthens solidarity with the unemployed. However, limited cultural capital decreases tolerance for nonconformity, which in turn weakens solidarity with the unemployed.

Conclusions and Discussion

If we conceive of solidarity as support for the relatively unconditional granting of social rights, the working class is predisposed to high levels of solidarity as a consequence of its support for economic redistribution, which stems from its weak economic position. However, its limited cultural capital and the intolerance for nonconformity this gives rise to predisposes it to low levels of solidarity. This classical cross-pressure mechanism (Lazarsfeld et al. 1972 [1944], 53) solves the puzzle addressed in this article. It explains why the working class exhibits a relative-
ly high level of support for economic redistribution, but does not differ from other classes in terms of the conditional solidarity in the context of the welfare state.

Discerning empirical studies on solidarity, Komter observes that 'it is striking that the results of (...) surveys are often inconsistent as to the effects on solidarity of education (and) income (...)’ (1999, 28). The analysis presented here gives an explanation. Although of course the highly educated tend to earn high incomes, education and income are not simply interchangeable indicators for economic position (‘social class’). As it happens, like social class itself, education is quite an ambiguous variable, entailing cultural capital as well. As a consequence, the effects of education and income depend on how solidarity is conceptualized and measured. The more strongly a measure of solidarity refers to support for economic redistribution, the more a high income and a high level of education reduce solidarity. The more strongly it is defined as tolerance for nonconformity or acceptance of cultural diversity, emphasizing the right to pursue nontraditional lifestyles and identities, however, the less significant economic position becomes. In these instances, a poor education indicating limited cultural capital becomes decisive for a low level of tolerance.

At a more general level, my findings give rise to some comments on how conclusions regarding levels of group or class solidarity are affected by 1) how solidarity is conceptualized and 2) whether altruistic motives are a prerequisite for solidarity. As these two issues are contested in sociological literature, the same often applies to claims regarding to the levels of solidarity of certain groups or classes, even if they are empirically founded.

Support for economic redistribution and tolerance for nonconformity have been considered motives for solidarity here. One might find this is contestable, as they can also be considered types of solidarity. Working-class support for economic redistribution is commonly discussed in these terms. Indeed, this very framing yields the paradoxical puzzle discussed here: the working-class tendency to support economic redistribution, while failing to support the relatively unconditional granting of social rights by a welfare state. A similar argument can be formulated with respect to tolerance for nonconformity, which might be considered ‘cultural’ solidarity, consisting of an inclination to protect cultural minorities who aspire to construct or maintain non-traditional identities and lifestyles. This kind of cultural type of solidarity boils down to an inclination to construct relatively ‘inclusionary’ distinctions between the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’ (Rorty 1989, Van Oorschot and Komter 1998, 22-23).

Conceiving of support for economic redistribution and tolerance for nonconformity as types of solidarity, and failing to systematically distinguish between social class and cultural capital, one can either claim that the working class exhibits more solidarity or less solidarity than other classes.

To complicate matters even further, Durkheim refers to a strong sense of common group identity and shared norms and values as ‘mechanical solidarity’. This type of solidarity gives rise to intolerance for nonconformity. Members of groups with strong common identities exhibit the most solidarity among themselves and for this very reason, the least solidarity in terms of tolerance for nonconformity or acceptance of cultural diversity. For instance, the very people who feel most strongly attached to and proud of their Dutch national identity are the ones who most strongly hold racist attitudes (Eisinga and Schepers 1989). So a systematic distinction needs to be drawn between solidarity as common identity and solidarity as acceptance of cultural diversity. If we fail to do so, people who favour a liberalization of immigration policy can be thought to have either more solidarity with illegal immigrants and cultural minorities generally, or less solidarity with their ‘own people’, as the racist rhetoric goes.

Lastly, there is no consensus in the literature as to whether solidarity can result from self-interest. Some argue that it can, and others feel that altruistic motives are necessary before one can speak of ‘real’ or ‘deeply held’ feelings of solidarity in any meaningful way (Van Oorschot and Komter 1998, 16-20). As a consequence, one might also contest that to the extent that it stems from self-interest, working-class support for economic redistribution constitutes a ‘real’ or heartfelt type of economic solidarity.

In sociological literature, solidarity comes in different flavours, which do not necessarily coincide. Support for economic redistribution and tolerance for nonconformity are essentially unrelated among the public at large. Solidarity as common identity and solidarity as acceptance of cultural diversity even tend to be negatively related. Groups or classes are likely to exhibit solidarity in one respect, and not in another. As a consequence, even if our claims about the levels of solidarity of certain groups or classes are empirically founded, they depend on how we decide to conceptualize solidarity and on whether we are prepared to consider solidarity stemming from self-interest as ‘real’ solidarity.

NOTES

1. Bourdieu also distinguishes objectified cultural capital, i.e. the possession of cultural goods (books, paintings etc.). In this article, objectified and embodied cultural capital have been combined into a single measure for cultural participation. As it is hard to imagine that the possession of cultural goods in itself - independent of embodied cultural capital - affects tolerance for nonconformity, only a single indicator for objectified cultural capital has been used: the number of books owned.

2. The acceptance or rejection of these two principles have been measured by the agreement or disagreement with two statements: "People on an unemployment benefit ought to be ashamed of it" and "People on an unemployment benefit should have the right to choose freely whether they want to live on this benefit or have a job". Agreement with the first statement is interpreted as a rejection of the right to social benefits. After all, it is a defining characteristic of a right that one does not have to be ashamed of using it. Disagreement with the second statement implies an acceptance of the obligation to work.
3. The fourth possible combination is treated as missing, as it only contains three cases.

4. These two systems were both introduced to the respondents by first stating that 'some people in The Netherlands propose changing the prevailing system of social benefits'. Next, in both the questions, a brief description of the changes proposed by 'these people' followed. In both the questions, it was made clear that the level of the benefits themselves would remain unchanged.

5. In both cases, work that requires only a minimum of training was chosen to ensure that anyone could plausibly do it. The levels of the social benefits are derived from the levels that applied at the time of data collection ('RW'). Respondents were asked to assume that in none of the cases were there any special justifications for declining the job, such as health problems or long distances to and from work.

6. In the four cases of work refusal, the higher the cut deemed fair, the higher the quantification of the corresponding category. The determinations of the two opposite variables are consistent with this. Combined evaluations of the right to social benefits and the obligation to work: 1) acceptance of both principles (0.10), 2) acceptance of the obligation to work and rejection of the right to social benefits (0.72), and 3) rejection of the obligation to work and acceptance of the right to social benefits (-1.27). Combined evaluations of the two alternative systems of social benefits: 1) workfare evaluated positively and basic income evaluated negatively (0.52), 2) workfare evaluated positively and basic income undecided (don't know) (0.19), 3) workfare and basic income both evaluated either positively or negatively (-0.35), and 4) basic income evaluated positively and workfare evaluated either negatively or undecided (-1.12).

7. The information needed is lacking for 0.7% of the 714 cases.

8. Of course this question was not posed to the self-employed. They have been given the same score here as workers and employees with a permanent contract (0).

9. Depending on the type of work one does, one's income tends to be higher if one is older, male and works more hours a week. As to the income differences between men and women, the reader is referred to Schippers (1995).

10. Among expected, young people, women, and people who only work a limited number of hours a week earn lower incomes. The combined effect of these two variables is considerable, as the rise of the explained variance from 28% to 48% indicates (the three separate effects are not shown in Table 3). Nevertheless, the initial income differences between the seven classes are hardly caused by disproportional numbers of young people, women, and part-time workers in the classes with the lowest average incomes. There is one exception, however, as the extremely low mean income of class III (routine manual) is caused by this. The income of the self-employed (class IV) declines dramatically after controlling for these variables, and is thus obviously caused by their relatively long working hours.

11. Steijn and Houtman (1998) have noted this as well. There are two likely causes for this striking finding, which are not mutually exclusive. First, as a consequence of recent socio-economic changes referred to by Beck (1992) as the rise of the risk society, it might be that job insecurity is no longer an exclusive characteristic of the working class. If this is the case, the usefulness of the EGP class scheme has gradually decreased due to changes in the real world. A second possibility is that this class scheme never adequately assessed job insecurity. It might have been a weak job insecurity indicator in the past as well.

REFERENCES


