Moral Traditionalism and Authoritarianism in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Converging Cultural Value Divides?

1. Introduction

Despite the many differences between political cultures of countries in the East and West of Europe that attracted serious scholarly attention in recent decades, national political agendas all across Europe have in the same period become increasingly captured by cultural issues (Kriesi 2010; Norris, Inglehart 2019). Heated debates on such topics as justifiability of abortion and same-sex marriage, or immigration and ways to deal with it have been seen to polarize both political parties and the public at large in different societies all across Europe (Kiss 2016; Król, Pustułka 2018; McGraw 2018; Norris, Inglehart 2019; Rivkin-Fish 2018).

The aforementioned cultural issues are part and parcel of two different cultural value divides, referred to as authoritarian-libertarian and morally traditional-progressive in this chapter. The authoritarian-libertarian value divide is all-out secular and pertains to matters of law and order and immigration. It pits those who accept, or even embrace, cultural and ethnic diversity against those who understand the latter as a cause of major social problems (Flanagan, Lee 2003; Stubager 2008; Houtman 2003). The moral traditionalism-progressiveness value divide, on the other hand, refers to cultural,

religious and political conflicts about the legitimacy of religiously inspired traditional moral values pertaining to sexuality, life and procreation, and the family (e.g., gay and lesbian rights, sexual freedom, abortion, euthanasia, and women's roles).

Many a political sociologist nowadays treats moral traditionalism-progressiveness and authoritarianism-libertarianism as largely equivalent value divides and blend them into one single value dimension that is central to a so-called 'new cultural cleavage' in politics (Kriesi 2010; Bornschier 2010). Recent findings, however, suggest that the overlap between the two divides is in fact a consequence of secularization and as such is only typical of the most secularized and most culturally progressive societies of Western Europe (Pless, Tromp, Houtman 2020; De Koster, Van der Waal 2007). Given its apparent widespread support for both types of rightists stances (e.g., traditionalist and authoritarian), Post-Communist Eastern Europe, in comparison with the West, rather represents an opposite case that so far has not been studied.

In this chapter, we thus add Post-Communist Eastern Europe into the equation and study cross-national variation in the overlap between these two value divides across Europe, i.e., in the extent to which they are interrelated or remain separate. Besides contributing theoretically and empirically to the existing literature on a so-called 'cultural cleavage' across Europe, this chapter also highlights whether moral traditionalism-progressiveness and authoritarianism-libertarianism do at all overlap in

Post-Communist Eastern Europe or rather tend to represent distinctive value dimensions.

In the remaining part of the chapter, we first discuss the two value divides in greater detail and then elaborate on how secularization has shaped the link between them. In the empirical part, we study how European countries differ in terms of both moral traditionalism and authoritarianism, and then analyze the overlap between the two value divides by means of statistical analysis of the survey data from the three waves of the European Values Study (1990, 1999, and 2008) for a pool of 44 European countries.

2. The Cultural Turn in Politics

2.1. Two Value Divides: One Religious and One Secular

The first of the two value divides central to this chapter, *moral traditionalism-progressiveness*, pertains to the contrast between morally traditionalist and morally progressive stances about matters of life and death, family and gender roles, and sexuality, with attitudes towards abortion and homosexuality arguably standing out as most typical nowadays (McGraw 2018; Adamczyk, Pitt 2009). The traditionalist pole of this first value divide is closely linked to Christian religion (De Koster, Van der Waal 2007; Laythe, Finkel, Kirkpatrick 2001), with those concerned embracing religiously inspired "normative guiding standards that prescribe appropriate behavior and proscribe

inappropriate behavior" in daily life (Storm 2016: 113). Those standards are understood as pre-given by a higher divine authority, as having proven their efficacy over centuries, and as more fundamental than man-made secular laws (De Koster, Van der Waal 2007).

The contrasting pole is represented by moral progressivists who tend to be non-religious and endorse the liberty to make individual lifestyle choices. They do as such not ground their moral principles in religion and do indeed reject the latter's notion of predefined social roles as well as its claims to unquestionable divine authority (Brown 2009; Houtman, Aupers, De Koster 2011). Such moral progressiveness sparks electoral support for the political parties of the New Left that have since the 1970s advocated individual liberty and opposed institutional coercion, be it by the churches, the state or corporations. Moral traditionalists, on the contrary, are triggered by the moral permissiveness this implies, which leads them to unite around Christian-Democratic or similar morally conservative parties (Knutsen 1989).

The second relevant value divide pertains to *authoritarianism-libertarianism*[1] and deals with the strictly secular matters of immigration and law and order. This divide is rooted not so much in religion, but rather in education (Stubager 2008; Houtman 2003; Van de Werfhorst, De Graaf 2004). The less educated are more likely to be

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[1] While there is a plethora of understandings of authoritarianism in the literature, most studies associate it with a preference for cultural sameness and cohesion that leads to unwillingness to accept cultural diversity. The other pole, represented by libertarianism, is associated with individual freedom in social and political sense but has nothing to do with the economic understanding of libertarianism (Stenner 2005; Lipset 1959; Flanagan, Lee 2003).

authoritarian and are less likely to embrace immigration and the ethnic and cultural and diversity brought by it, since they tend to value order and control over individual freedom (Stubager 2010). This is why the less educated have become the happy hunting ground for New-Rightist political parties that boast anti-immigrant sentiments and populist zeal (Betz, Johnson 2004; Steenvoorden, Harteveld 2018). The more educated, on the contrary, tend to be libertarian, i.e., to embrace ethnic and cultural diversity and to foreground individual liberty (Flanagan, Lee 2003; Stenner 2005).

2.2.   *A Transformation of Cleavage Politics*

The value divides of moral traditionalism versus progressiveness and authoritarianism versus libertarianism are typically understood as basically interchangeable, because they both reflect a more general opposition between cultural conservatives and cultural progressives (e.g., Flanagan, Lee 2003; Houtman 2003). The two are as such held to be jointly central to a newly emerged 'cultural cleavage' that has since the 1960s transformed Western politics.[2]

Traditionally, most research has been devoted to the so-called 'class cleavage', which pits a leftist-leaning working class against rightist-voting privileged classes in a

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[2] Cleavage politics generally conceived refers to the prevalence of (1) structurally embedded social groups with (2) opposing values and/or interests that are (3) reflected in distinctive voting patterns (Lipset, Rokkan 1967).

political struggle that revolves around redistributive politics, i.e., the desirability of state intervention in matters of economic distribution between classes (Dalton 1996). In most Western democracies, however, the dominance of this class cleavage has shattered from the 1970s onwards due to cultural issues capturing Western political agendas, causing a steady decline of the traditional relationship between class and voting (Clark, Lipset 1991; Nieuwbeerta 1996; Elff 2007; Kriesi 2010).

According to Inglehart (1977), this transformation of cleavage politics is due to the coming of age in the 1960s of a new, so-called 'postmaterialist' generation that has brought cultural issues pertaining to personal liberty, strengthening of democracy and acceptance of cultural diversity to the forefront of democratic politics. This coincided with the emergence of new types of political parties, from the 1970s onwards those of the New Left and from the 1980s onwards those of the New Right – parties that do not so much engage in conflict about economic distribution between classes, but foreground different, albeit contrasting, types of cultural values instead (Elff 2007; Kriesi 2010).

Unlike traditional 'old' left versus right class voting, class does not explain voting for these new types of parties. For while the middle class is indeed markedly more culturally progressive than the working class, this is not due to its class-based economic position, but rather to its education, which here operates as an indicator for cultural capital rather than class in an economic sense (Achterberg, Houtman 2006; Houtman 2003; Houtman, Achterberg 2010). In combination with the increased

political significance of cultural issues since the 1970s, this has led to a transformation

of cleavage politics in the West, more specifically a proliferation of a new cultural

cleavage with leftist-voting well educated pitted against rightist-voting low educated

(Achterberg 2006; Van der Waal, Achterberg, Houtman 2007).

2.3. Where and Why Are the Two Value Divides Most Strongly Connected?

Because many empirical studies have demonstrated positive correlations

between moral traditionalism-progressiveness and authoritarianism-libertarianism, the

two value divides have often been combined to distinguish between cultural

conservativism and cultural progressiveness more generally conceived (e.g., Flanagan,

Lee 2003; Houtman 2003). Stenner (2009, 2005) has, however, demonstrated that the

two can and should be distinguished theoretically and empirically, principally due to the

fact that moral traditionalists are specifically triggered by violations of religiously

inspired norms, while authoritarians are triggered by threats to sameness and conformity

more generally. Indeed, the oft-found overlap between moral traditionalism and

authoritarianism does at a closer and more critical look in fact stem from an overlap

between their respective counterparts, i.e., moral progressiveness and basically secular

libertarianism (De Koster, Van der Waal 2007). This is because moral progressiveness

and secular libertarianism alike foreground individual liberty and oppose institutional coercion, be it by religious institutions or otherwise.

Based on the data from the Netherlands, one of the most secularized and morally progressive countries in the world (Norris, Inglehart 2004), De Koster and Van der Waal claim that the relationship between the two value divides is identical across national contexts. A recent study, however, suggests otherwise: it demonstrates that secularization has sparked a dual rejection of moral traditionalism and authoritarianism in the name of personal liberty, which leads the two value divides to coalesce (Pless, Tromp, Houtman 2020). Processes of secularization, understood as a decline both in religion's social significance and in numbers of religious individuals, thus erode the dominance of religiously informed moral traditionalism and increase the appeal of individual liberty and personal authenticity (Brown 2009; McLeod 2007).

The turn to moral progressiveness spawned by secularization thus strengthens the overlap between our two value divides because it increases the numbers of those who oppose moral traditionalism and authoritarianism alike. This is why the most secularized Western-European countries display the strongest overlaps between both value divides, while the correlation between the two is only weak or even completely absent in massively religious ones: because the former countries are less morally traditionalist than the latter (Pless, Tromp, Houtman 2020).

While secularization has thus been shown to make the two value divides overlap, existing studies tend to focus exclusively on Western Europe since Post-Communist Eastern-European countries are quite different from the West in terms of secularization. Some of them have experienced religious revivals after the end of Communism, others have remained as secular as they were back then, and yet others have much like Western Europe been exposed to secularization (Norris, Inglehart 2004; Northmore-Ball, Evans 2016; Kulkova 2015).

In this chapter, we thus bring Post-Communist Eastern-European countries into the equation and study whether this theory also holds for this region, more specifically, whether, how and why the two value divides are related there. In what follows, we first explore *whether* and *how* European countries from various regions differ in terms of levels of both moral traditionalism and authoritarianism, and also in terms of the overlap between the two value divides. We then move to study whether the two value divides do indeed show more overlap in more secular societies due to lower levels of contextual traditionalism there.

3. Moral Traditionalism and Authoritarianism across Europe

3.1. Measuring the Two Divides and their Overlap

In the empirical part, we begin by studying how European countries differ in terms of both the two relevant value domains and the overlap between them. To do so, we use survey data from the 2008 wave of the European Values Study for 52,000 of respondents from 44 European countries.

Moral traditionalism-progressiveness is measured through a scale constructed from the five questions that indicate whether a respondent finds homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, divorce, and suicide justifiable.[3] These questions reflect respondent's moral stances on matters of life and death, procreation and family life. The resulting scale ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 indicating strongest moral traditionalism. For each country, we then average individual scores to compute a measure of *contextual moral traditionalism*.

Authoritarianism-libertarianism is measured through one's attitudes towards immigration, and law and order. To construct a scale for it, we use five questions. Four of them measure one's opposition to having 1) immigrants, 2) people of different race, 3) Muslims, and 4) ex-criminals as neighbors, while an additional fifth one measures whether one thinks the native born should have priority in getting a job.[4] The scores

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[3] All items within the scale for moral traditionalism range from 0 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). Only those who responded to at least four of these five questions were assigned a score for moral traditionalism. The items were first standardized and then combined with equal weights. The scale is highly reliable with an overall Cronbach's Alpha of 0.81.
[4] The first four items within the for authoritarianism scale are binary, while the fifth one (whether one thinks the native born should have priority in getting a job) measured on a 3-point scale. All items were

were then transformed to range from 0 to 10, with 10 indicating strongest authoritarianism. *Contextual authoritarianism* is computed by averaging individual levels of authoritarianism within each country.

To measure how strong the link between the two value divides is (i.e., how much the two overlap), we compute zero-order correlations between the individual scales of moral traditionalism-progressiveness and authoritarianism-libertarianism for each of the countries separately.

4.1. National and Regional Differences in Traditionalism and Authoritarianism across Europe

Figure 1 visualizes mean moral traditionalism and authoritarianism in 2008 for all 44 European countries separately, as well as the correlation between these two cultural divides in a given country.[5] The countries are grouped into regions. The bars in Figure 1 represent mean traditionalism and mean authoritarianism for each country (see the ax on the left for the values), while the circles represent correlations between the

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standardized and then taken with equal weights to compose the scale. The resulting scale is fairly reliable with an overall Cronbach's Alpha of 0.64.

[5] *Northern Europe*: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. *Western Europe*: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Switzerland, UK. *Southern Europe*: Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain. *Eastern Europe*: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine.

two in a corresponding country (see the ax on the right for the values). Table 1 provides summary statistics for the four European regions (Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western Europe), and for Europe as a whole.

(Figure 1 here)

(Table 1 here)

From both Figure 1 and Table 1, it is clear that the Northern-European countries feature the lowest levels of moral traditionalism (all countries score below 4.52 with an average of 4.15 for Northern Europe as a whole) and authoritarianism alike (all below 3.00 with a Northern-European average of 2.28). It is also clear that the link between the two value divides is strongest in this region: the correlation is 0.21 on average, never falls below 0.16 (Finland) and reaches a maximum of 0.26 (Denmark). The second group of countries in Figure 1 represents Western Europe. These countries are more morally traditionalist (5.51 on average) as well as more authoritarian (2.70) than the Northern-European ones. The link between the two value divides is also slightly weaker here: 0.16 for the region as a whole, ranging from 0.03 (Northern Ireland) to 0.22 (Austria and France).

Southern Europe is the most morally traditionalist part of Europe with mean

moral traditionalism levels around 7.43, which is hardly surprising given the high

number of massively religious countries in this region (e.g., deeply religious Malta with

an average score of no less than 8.38). The countries in the south of Europe do also

feature higher levels of authoritarianism than either Northern or Western Europe (3.65

on average), while the link between the two value divides is weaker in this region (0.11

on average, but with sizable differences between countries). These differences pertain

especially to a contrast between two groups of countries within the region. On the one

hand, older Southern-European democracies like Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece, all

demonstrate lower levels of traditionalism and authoritarianism and stronger links

between the two (around 0.2 and higher). On the other hand, former Yugoslavian Post-

Communist countries rather boast variegated combinations of traditionalism,

authoritarianism, and relationships between the two, the latter ranging from negative in

Bosnia and Kosovo, to weakly positive in Slovenia (0.10) and Serbia (0.13) and more

strongly positive in Montenegro (0.20).

The Eastern-European countries, finally, are only slightly less traditionalist than

the Southern-European ones yet more authoritarian than the rest of Europe. The average

level of moral traditionalism within this group of countries is 7.30, ranging from 5.67 in

the Czech Republic to 8.66 in Moldova. In all countries within this category, mean

authoritarianism is as high as 3.91, ranging from 3.23 in Hungary to 4.40 in Lithuania

and 4.54 in Georgia. The two value divides are also less strongly correlated in Eastern Europe, with an average correlation of no more than 0.05. Ten out of the fifteen countries in this region feature (typically insignificant) correlations below 0.10, with the lowest ones – that even turn out to be negative – recorded for Georgia (-0.08) and Hungary (-0.05). Indeed, only five Eastern-European countries show correlations higher than 0.10, with none of these being higher than 0.15 (e.g., Moldova, Slovakia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Lithuania).

On the overall, the link between the two value divides appears to be stronger in those countries where both traditionalism and authoritarianism are at the lowest. As levels of traditionalism and authoritarianism increase, the link between the two divides becomes weaker. The Eastern-European countries feature levels of moral traditionalism that are among the highest in Europe, only slightly below massively religious Southern Europe, and they stand out as more authoritarian than the rest of Europe. The link between the two value divides is moreover decidedly weaker in Eastern Europe than elsewhere in Europe, even though there are substantial differences between the various countries within this cluster.

4. Secularization and the Overlap between the Two Divides

4.2. Exploring the Link between the Two Value Divides

In the previous subsections, we have shown some clear regional differences not only in terms of mean levels of moral traditionalism and authoritarianism but also in terms of the overlap between the two value divides. Our theory, however, suggests that the strength of the link between the two (i.e., whether they overlap or remain separate) depends on how secularized a given society is. In this part of the analysis, we thus explore how the strength of the link between the two divides varies across European societies characterized by different levels of religiosity and moral traditionalism.

To ensure that we have enough societies with both high and low levels of contextual religiosity and moral traditionalism, we add observations from the two previous waves of the EVS (1990 and 1999) into analysis.[6] This gives us 100 country-year combinations that are referred to as *contexts*. The same measure of the overlap between the two divides as in the previous part of the analysis is used here: zero-order correlations between moral traditionalism-progressiveness and authoritarianism-libertarianism calculated for each of the contexts in the sample. We measure c*ontextual religiosity* for each of the country-year combinations as the mean score of an individual-level religiosity scale. It consists of attending religious services at least once a month and believing in god, heaven, hell, sin, and life after death.[7] The least religious context

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[6] The overall dataset includes more than 108,000 individuals nested within 100 contexts (44 countries nested in three waves). The average number of respondents per context is 1,119 (EVS 2011).

[7] All of the six variables within the individual religiosity scale are binary, yet strongly correlated and loading heavily on one factor with an Eigenvalue of 4.8 that explains 91% of the variance. The resulting

is Bulgaria in 1990 (1.97 out of 10) and the most religious one Malta in 1990 (9.18 out of 10). Contextual moral traditionalism was described in the previous section.

Figure 2 displays the strength of the link between the two divides across contexts with different levels of religiosity on the one hand and contexts with different levels of moral traditionalism on the other. The left-hand side of Figure 2 demonstrates that the most secular countries of Western Europe boast the strongest connections between our two value divides, even though the pattern is quite weak. If we plot the same correlations against contextual moral traditionalism rather than contextual religiosity (see the right-hand side of Figure 2), however, the pattern is considerably more pronounced. The strongest overlap between the two divides is observed for the least traditionalist societies whereas in the most traditionalist contexts the link between the two appears to be considerably weaker.

(Figure 2 here)

4.3. Explaining the Link between the Two Value Divides

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scale (mean standardized scores) is highly reliable with a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.86 and is recoded to range from 0 (least religious) to 10 (most religious).

While the link between our two value divides is definitely stronger in the more secular and especially in less traditionalist countries, the question now is whether these observed differences between the countries occur actually due to secularization and are not connected to some regional specifics of Europe? To test this, we perform multilevel statistical analysis and study *why* the link between the two value divides is stronger in some countries than in others.

In multilevel regression analysis, we use the strength of the link between the two divides as the dependent variable.[8] The 100 contexts are treated as units of analysis, with countries serving as a second-level grouping variable. The explanatory variables are *contextual religiosity* and *contextual moral traditionalism*. Control variables are region of Europe, time[9], and contextual authoritarianism. We control for time in all models and, because the two value divides have so often been found to be interconnected, we also control for contextual authoritarianism in models that include contextual moral traditionalism.

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[8] This approach is typically referred to as two-stage multilevel regression modeling. In the first stage, we use individual-level observations to calculate zero-order correlation scores between the two value dimensions for each context under study. In the second stage, these correlation scores are used as the dependent variable in regression models. This approach does not only provide computational benefits (e.g., we fit models with two levels instead of adding the individual level as a third one), but also prevents the problem of obtaining statistically significant results with negligible effect sizes at the individual level (a problem caused by extremely large samples at the individual level) (Fairbrother 2014). The intra-class correlation (ICC) of 0.53 suggests that multilevel modeling is required in the second stage of analysis to account for country-level variation in the dependent variable.

[9] *Time* is measured as the respective wave of the EVS (1990, 1999, 2008) and is included in all models as a continuous predictor.

We introduce the variables in the model in a stepwise fashion, starting with an exploration of regional differences in the strength of the link between the two divides, with a special focus on Post-Communist Eastern Europe. Model 1 in Table 2 shows that the link between the two value divides is considerably weaker in countries in Southern and Eastern than in Western Europe. On average, the correlation between the two is by 0.053 lower in the South than in the West, and by 0.094 weaker in the East than in the West. The link between the two is thus strongest in the North and the West, followed by the South, and then the East.

We then enter contextual religiosity into the equation, which enables us to see whether the initially recorded differences between the European regions can be attributed to contextual differences in religiosity. In Model 2, contextual religiosity has a weak negative effect on the strength of the link: countries that are more secular do indeed demonstrate a slightly stronger link between moral traditionalism and authoritarianism. At this point, Southern contexts no longer differ from Western ones, which means that contextual religiosity actually accounts for the weaker correlations between the two divides in Southern Europe. Even controlling for contextual religiosity, however, Eastern Europe still differs from Western Europe.

Model 3 then demonstrates that bringing contextual traditionalism into the equation eliminates all regional differences whatsoever. Contextual moral traditionalism has a strong and substantial negative effect on the strength of the link under study: with

one unit increase in contextual moral traditionalism, the correlation between the two

divides decreases by 0.029. This translates into a difference in the correlation of no less

than 0.172 between the least and most traditionalist contexts, with all other variables

held constant.

(Table 2 here)

The link between the two divides is in effect stronger in the more secular

European countries, but is this *because* the latter are the least morally traditionalist

ones? Model 4 proves that this is indeed the case: it is contextual traditionalism that

accounts for the strength of the link between the two divides, not contextual religiosity

or regional specifics. The effect of the former even increases, while that of the latter

loses its statistical significance. All regional dummies are insignificant here, which

means that the previously recorded differences between Eastern and Western Europe are

actually due to differences in levels of moral traditionalism. In short, our two value

divides do indeed overlap less in Eastern Europe, because countries in this region are

more morally traditionalist.

5. Discussion

In this chapter, we have studied whether and how Post-Communist Eastern-European countries differ from the rest of Europe in terms of religiously informed moral traditionalism-progressiveness and basically secular authoritarianism-libertarianism, and in terms of the overlap between these two divides.

Our first principal finding is that Post-Communist Eastern-European countries do indeed differ from the rest of Europe when it comes to both value dimensions. These countries feature levels of moral traditionalism that are among the highest in Europe, indeed only slightly below those of the massively religious Southern-European countries, and they stand out as more authoritarian than the rest of Europe. Post-Communist Eastern-European countries do as such boast political cultures that are less cosmopolitan and less open to acceptance of cultural diversity and individual liberty than those in the rest of Europe.

We have also studied variations in the strength of the overlap between the two value divides across Europe. Confirming a previous analysis that remained confined to Western-European countries, the two value divides do only coalesce in the wake of processes of secularization, because the latter spark a dual rejection of moral traditionalism and authoritarianism in the name of personal liberty (Pless, Tromp, Houtman 2020). The two value divides thus tend to overlap in the more secular societies *because* they are the least traditionalist.

The other way around, moral traditionalism-progressiveness and authoritarianism-libertarianism tend to remain distinct value divides in the most religious parts of Europe *because* those societies are the most traditionalist. These findings are especially important for the countries of Post-Communist Eastern Europe that fall into this category: our analysis shows that the two divides there are virtually unrelated there because the population remains comparatively traditionalist, and *not* due to some regional specifics (or even Post-Communist legacy).

This leads us to the conclusion that, even though often suggested otherwise, the two value divides do not necessarily blend into one single, more generally defined value divide between cultural conservatives and cultural progressives. Moreover, in the case of Post-Communist Eastern Europe, blending the two value divides into one broad cultural dimension in politics is especially misleading since the two divides there rather refer to separate cultural discussions.

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Figure 1. Mean Levels of Moral Traditionalism and Authoritarianism, and Mean Traditionalism-Authoritarianism Correlations per country of Europe, 2008 (EVS wave 4).


Table 1. Mean Levels of Moral Traditionalism and Authoritarianism, and Mean Traditionalism-Authoritarianism Correlations per region of Europe, 2008 (EVS wave 4).

Region of Europe	Mean Moral Traditionalism	Mean Authoritarianism	Traditionalism-Authoritarianism Correlation
North	4.15	2.28	0.21
West	5.51	2.7	0.16
South	7.43	3.65	0.11
East	7.3	3.91	0.05
Europe in total	6.61	3.39	0.24

Figure 2. The Link between Moral Traditionalism and Authoritarianism across Europe (Zero-Order Correlations, EVS 1990, 1999, 2008)

Table 2. The Link between Traditionalism and Authoritarianism across Europe:
Multilevel Regression Analysis Results (EVS 1990, 1999, 2008)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contextual traditionalism			-0.029***	-0.036***
			(0.009)	(0.012)
Contextual religiosity		-0.009*		0.006
		(0.005)		(0.007)
European region (reference=West)				
North	0.010	0.003	-0.017	-0.018
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)
South	-0.053**	-0.043	0.001	0.002
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)
East	-0.094***	-0.090***	-0.045	-0.041
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Time (wave)	-0.015*	-0.014*	-0.022***	-0.024***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Contextual authoritarianism			-0.006	-0.004
			(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	0.228***	0.268***	0.435***	0.447***
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Random Effects (variances):				
Country	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Country-year	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of contexts	100	100	100	100
Number of countries	44	44	44	44
Snijders/Bosker R2 (level 1)	0.25	0.26	0.34	0.34
Snijders/Bosker R2 (level 2)	0.33	0.32	0.41	0.42

Standard errors in parentheses; unstandardized coefficients reported.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$